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Abstract 
Programmes and policies for a Circular Economy (CE) are fast becoming key to regional and 
international plans for creating sustainable futures. Framed as a technologically driven and 
economically profitable vision of continued growth in a resource-scarce world, the CE has of 
late been taken up by the European Commission and global business leaders alike. However, 
within CE debates and documentation, little is said about the social and political implications 
of such transformative agendas. That is, whilst CE proponents claim their agenda is ‘radical’, 
this paper outlines its inability to address many deeply embedded challenges around issues of 
consumption and the consumer, echoing as it does the problematic (and arguably failed) 
agendas of sustainable consumption / lifestyles. Using the Sharing Economy as an example, 
we argue here that the ontological and sociological assumptions of the CE must be open to 
more ‘radical’ critique and reconsideration if this agenda is to deliver the profound transfor-
mations that its advocates claim are within our collective reach. 
 
Acknowledgments 
This research was funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Coun-
cil grant EP/KͲʹ͸͵ͺͲ/ͳ ǮClosed Loop Emotionally Valuable E-waste Recovery (CLEV-ERȌǯ.
 2 
1. Introduction: The rise of the Circular Economy 
The future is circular. At least, that is the message at the heart of the recent European 
resource efficiency agenda. Here regional prosperity is overtly linked to ǲkeeping valua-
ble materials in circulation through a series of systemic feedback loops between life-
cycle stages, powered through resource-efficient industrial processesǳ ȋ(obson, ʹͲͳͷ: 
1). In response, policy makers, corporations, NGOs and academics have, in increasing 
numbers, been taking up and championing the circular economy (CE) message. For one, 
the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF) — an organization established with the sole 
purpose of promoting and facilitating moves towards a CE—has enrolled a plethora of institutions ȋe.g. Google, Cisco and PhillipsȌ to its ǮCE ͳͲͲǯ programme. This voluntary strategy aims to ǲenable organisations to develop new opportunities and realise their circular economy ambitions fasterǳ ȋEMF, 2015b: no page). And in December 2015, the European Commission launched ǮClosing the loop - An EU action plan for the Circular Economyǯ, which aims to transition the EU towards a 
sustainable, low carbon, resource efficient and competitive econo-my…to transform our economy and generate new and sustainable com-
petitive advantages for Europe (EC, 2015a: 1). 
At face value, such programmes and pronouncements are good news given growing 
concerns about burgeoning resource (in)security, the over-use of virgin materials in 
production streams, and prevailing linear production-consumption-waste processes. 
Even with some successes in improving recycling uptake and systems, as well gains in 
energy efficiency measures (Sioshansi, 2013), demand for resources are set to continue 
increasing into this century alongside rising global population, increased urbanisation 
and proliferating consumerism (Lee et al., 2013; Prior et al., 2012). As such, ideas of the 
CE are both timely and arguably necessary, if we are to circumvent what some see as a 
looming (and indeed, already commenced) resource and ecological crisis (e.g. García-
Olivares & Solé, 2014; WWF et al., 2014). 
Invariably, however such large-scale transformative frameworks raise many questions, 
including what constitutes an optimal (or indeed a workable) CE, and how best to 
achieve it. For the most part, debates about the aims of, and pathways towards, the CE 
have fore-grounded the economic gains to be had through the reconfiguration of mate-
rial life cycles, fostered by the good governance of supply chains, all set within an ena-
bling policy and governance context (e.g. EC, 2015a). For some, the CE is fundamentally a new Ǯtechnological revolutionǯ ȋEMF, ʹͲͳͷaȌ founded upon improved product design, 
more efficient manufacturing and the recapturing of value from Ǯusedǯ materials. This invariably speaks to the CEǯs roots in the sub-field of Industrial Ecology (e.g. see Ander-
sen, 2007). Here, a functional CE is fostered primarily through the facilitation of materi-
al symbiosis between diverse companies and production processes often located in eco-
industrial parks (Gibbs & Deutz, 2007; Mathews & Tan, 2011) that enable companies to 
cascade resources between processes and sites. 
Yet, more is arguably at stake within the CE than where specific businesses are located 
and how their manufacturing systems are (re)calibrated. In his opening speech at the 
recent 2015 UN Stakeholder Conference on the Circular Economy in Brussels, the First 
Vice-President Frans Timmermans (EC, 2015b: no page) asserted that: 
everyone who looks at the structure of our economy, the structure of 
our society even, will see that the future is not in low-wage production, 
that the future is not in making things with finite components. The fu-
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ture is providing services to our citizens in a long-term process. Ser-
vices that then materialize in products, instead of the other way around, 
and products that are used and re-used time and time again, so that you 
reduce the use of raw materials and don't deplete the earth's natural 
resources. 
In here then are rather tentative hints of the CE as a more transformative reconfigura-tion: that Ǯour society evenǯ will have to be reshaped to facilitate this future of use and 
re-use. However, to date, frameworks for, and analysis of, the CE have arguably side-
stepped detailed considerations of its broader socio-economic implications, being all-
but silent on what a CE society might look like. What form then could and should circu-
lar socio-economic institutions, norms and shared practices take, and what processes, 
values and actors will get us there? 
This paper aims to explore some aspects of these questions, as a means of opening up 
debate about the broader socio-political implications of a CE agenda. Specifically, it ar-
gues that, to date, talk of the CE has presented a curtailed and impoverished view of the 
role of citizens. That is—and as the Timmerman quote above suggests—within the CE 
the citizen is fundamentally a consumer of reconfigured and partially dematerialized 
services i.e. sustainable product service systems (European Commission, 2015; Tukker, 
2013). Indeed, the recent European Commission announcements on the CE place the 
citizen as inseparable from the consumer, whose role is to respond to correct labelling 
and price signals, produce less household waste, and participate in Ǯ[i]nnovative forms of consumptionǯ ȋibid.: ͹Ȍ such as the much-lauded sharing economy and forms of Ǯcol-laborative consumptionǯ. Despite research that shows the challenges and limits of sus-
tainable product service systems (e.g. see Piscicelli et al., 2015), the role of the citizen 
thus appears to be fundamentally one of accepting or rejecting new and diverse busi-
ness models, in line with re-jigged product and service life cycles. 
In response, we argue that such a de-politicized role ascribed to the citizen within the 
CE is in line with prevailing approaches to fostering sustainable consumption patterns or Ǯsustainable lifestylesǯ ȋ(obson, ʹͲͳ͵; Lorek & Fuchs, ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ, strongly echoing an eco-
logical modernist take on the future. Here, the norms of economic growth and sustained 
material throughputs remain unquestioned in the face of the promises of greater effi-ciencies and expectations placed on us all i.e. that we able and willing to become Ǯgreen consumersǯ ȋAkenji, ʹͲͳͶ; Fuchs & Lorek, 2005) via an unquestioned reliance upon, and 
uptake of, technologically-mediated forms of social engagement. However, as this paper 
seeks to explore, if the CE does mark out a structural societal shift as Timermanns and 
others suggest, then the limited role being ascribed to the citizen requires fresh analysis if we are to truly ǲavoid the irreversible damages caused by using up resources at a rate 
that exceeds the Earth's capacity to renew them in terms of climate and biodiversity, air, 
soil and water pollutionǳ ȋEC, ʹͲͳͷa: ʹȌ. That is, if the CE is indeed going to be ǲrestora-tive, regenerative, and renewableǳ ȋEMF, ʹͲͳͷa: ʹ͵Ȍ, the socio-political meanings of 
these adjectives need to also be thought through to make them central to CE processes 
and goals. 
In making this argument, this paper is structured as follows. The opening section gives a 
brief précis of the central tenets of the CE, focusing specifically on the place that con-
sumption and the consumer are given within current framings. We then consider a key concept in the CEǯs arguments about the transformative potential of current consump-
tion patterns: the sharing economy (SE). The following section then presents a critical 
discussion of the SE, and in particular focuses on the gap between its proffered benefits 
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and actual evidence of positive socio-environmental impacts to date. Specifically, we ar-gue that the SE is not an inherently Ǯwin winǯ series of innovations. Rather, such ad-
vancements come with costs, which include inconsistencies between the discourses and actual experiences of participating in these forms of sharing, community and Ǯfor-profitǯ 
exchange. The final substantive section highlights how alternate framings of the econo-
my and the citizen/consumer provide some insight into more Ǯradicalǯ visions of a so-
cially sustainable CE, followed by a brief section of concluding comments.  
 
2. The circular economy: ecological modernization re-booted? 
At its core, the CE is an economically and politically palatable response to aspirations 
for sustainable growth in the context of mounting pressures on global resources. At pre-
sent, most advanced and developing economies, like those of the EU, operate through 
fundamentally linear models of resource use. Here, discrete material products reach an ȋoften too briefȌ Ǯend of lifeǯ ȋCooper, ʹͲͳʹȌ, with some materials re-captured via recy-
cling and to a lesser extent, re-use. Transitioning to a CE thus aims to proliferate these 
established norms of reusing, repairing, refurbishing and recycling materials and prod-ucts, as well as Ǯdesigning inǯ greater product longevity and repair-ability from the out-
set. As such, waste is revalued and turned into a resource, and products are consciously 
(re)designed to create materials flow that keep the value added for as long as possible 
(EC, 2014). 
Visions of a CE that aim to replace linear economic models with the promise of abun-dance without ȋmuchȌ waste are arguably ǲpotent and reassuring discourses of a sus-tainable futureǳ ȋ(obson, ʹͲͳͷ: ͵Ȍ. Circulating from high-level policy settings like the 
UN and the EU to environmental programmes and NGOs, the global reach of CE thinking 
has now shifted from the long-standing niche theory of Industrial Ecology to a main-
stream political-economic agenda of transformative, structural change (Preston, 2012). 
For example, within the EU much political concern is leveled at increasing concentra-
tions—as well as decreasing world-wide supplies—of strategic raw materials outside of 
regional and domestic markets. The Resource Efficient Europe Initiative as part of the 
Europe 2020 program has thus prioritized the CE as a key policy area, to secure sus-
tainable growth and job development, and promote: competitiveness, innovation… growth and job creation… and provide 
consumers with more durable and innovative products that provide 
monetary savings and an increased quality of life (EC, 2015c: 3).  
Outside of Europe, China has implemented its own version of a state-led CE, enshrined 
as an official national development goal (Mathews & Tan, 2011) that integrates closed-
loop policies and industrial symbiosis as a multi-scalar strategy (Su et al., 2013). On the 
ground, this has reportedly led to a greater uptake of eco-design principles, cleaner 
production audits, the development of eco-industrial parks (e.g., Suzhou and Tianjin) 
and larger eco-cities initiatives (Geng et al., 2009; Mathews & Tan, 2011). However, 
many challenges remain, such as a lack of systematic information, poor enforcement, 
and lack of public participation in the shifting of consumption practices (Geng & Dober-
stein, 2008; Su et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2008).  
Beyond states and regions, certain organisations have also been advocating the CE as a 
viable and desirable model of a future socio-economic system. For example, in their re-cent Ǯtoolkitǯ, the Ellen MacArthur Foundation ȋʹͲͳͶ, ʹͲͳͷaȌ offers a prescription for a 
European-led CE based on the idea of Ǯgrowth withinǯ the region. This is to be realized 
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through a range of actions drawn from their headliner acrostic ǮReSOLVEǯ: Regenerate, 
Share, Optimize, Loop, Virtualize, Exchange (EMF, 2015a). Such actions focus on scien-tific and technological challenges of CE, e.g. ǮOptimizeǯ equates with improving efficien-cy, removing waste and Ǯleveraging big dataǯ ȋEMF, ʹͲͳͷa: ʹͳȌ. Taken together, translat-ing these verbs into reality is argued to amount to a ǲradical shift in perspectiveǳ consti-tuting nothing less than ǲthe next major European political economy projectǳ ȋEMF, 
2015a: 12).  But how Ǯradicalǯ is the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and European Commissionǯs vision of the CE, if we take the word Ǯradicalǯ to its etymological foundations of denoting roots, 
essence and origins? We argue here that, as currently framed as a pathway to large scale 
transformative change, the prevailing vision of the CE is far from radical, as it fails to 
address the roots and origins of the issues it claims to remedy. In short, it strongly ech-
oes ecological modernist arguments that economy and ecology—or capitalism and the 
environment—can be effectively and efficiently combined to produce a form of sustain-
ability (Roberts & Collwell, 2001), one that does not fundamentally disrupt the status 
quo in terms of power, norms and politics (e.g. see Conca et al., 2002; Dauvergne, 2010; 
Speth, 2008). In other words, through technological and policy innovation, we can ǲovercome environmental crisis without leaving the path of modernizationǳ (Gibbs, 
2006: 196; Mol & Spaargaren, 1993;): a form of modernization wherein market forces 
are the central agent in delivering change. Thus we can become ǲboth rich and greenǳ ȋMonbiot, ʹͲͳͷȌ, in the ǲconviction that knowledge and technology, applied with wis-dom, might allow for a good, or even great, Anthropoceneǳ ȋAsafu-Adjaye et al., 2015: 
6). 
Echoing ecological modernists view of the future, extant visions of the CE frame it as re-
alized through the wide-scale adoption of Ǯgreenǯ technology and digital infrastructure, 
created and delivered by global corporations who lead the charge through voluntarily 
building collaborative networks and alliances. In this vision, local, regional and national governments are fundamentally the Ǯsupport staffǯ, providing positive stimulus and re-
wards for firms that adopt circular practices and business models (EMF, 2014: 26). As 
such, the prevailing framing of the CE is one firmly couched in a form of reboot capital-
ism or Capitalism 2.0 (Kaletsky, 2010; Townsend, 2012). Although there are many vari-ations on this theme, such frameworks include forms of Ǯcooperative capitalismǯ ȋPorrit, ʹͲͳʹȌ, Ǯbreakthrough capitalismǯ ȋElkington & Zeitz, ʹͲͳͶȌ or Ǯnaturalized capitalismǯ, which allows Ǯglobal capitalism to co-exist with its natural biospheric limitsǯ ȋ(awkin et al., ͳͻͻͻ; Mathews, ʹͲͳͳ: ͺ͸ͻȌ. These approaches thus are ǲnot [about] the end of capi-
talism as an ideology, but the issue of how capitalismǯs technical components — which 
have come off the rails — can be reformedǳ ȋSchwab, ʹͲͳʹ: no pageȌ. We argue here, however, that this amounts to incremental rather than radical transformations, a Ǯweakǯ 
rather than a Ǯstrongǯ form of sustainability: the latter of which has been argued as vital 
in securing socio-economically and environmentally sustainable futures (e.g. see Fuchs 
& Lorek, 2005; Hobson, 2013). )n such Ǯweakǯ approaches to sustainability, citizens primarily feature as consumers, 
performing their ecological and civic duty in the CE through being willing and able to shift extant consumption practices in response to external signals or Ǯnudgesǯ ȋprimarily labels and pricingȌ, which includes seeing Ǯusershipǯ replace ownership in some (but not allȌ forms of consumption ȋAkenji, ʹͲͳͶȌ. This notion, of the uptake of domestic Ǯsus-tainable lifestylesǯ, has circulated in policy and practitioner circles for decades, funda-
mentally assuming that civic virtues (e.g. doing oneǯs bit for the environmentȌ can and 
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will be translated into private practices ȋe.g. recycling, buying ǮgreenǯȌ, thus fostering the norm of Ǯgreen citizenshipǯ, performed via consumption and waste practices ȋ(ob-
son, 2013). However, to date, these discourses and related interventions have failed to 
make notable in-roads to citizensǯ resource uses, with continued debate about why this 
is the case (e.g. Reisch & Thøgersen, 2015; Shove, 2014), and why there is still a notable 
silence on the key issue of reducing absolute levels of consumption (Princen, 2005). In-
stead, discourses of sustainable consumption / lifestyles assume that adequate levels of 
efficiency and sustainability can be designed into, and captured from, goods and ser-
vices from the outset. This runs contrary to strong evidence that the decrease in the re-
source intensity of material goods is failing to keep pace with the rise in absolute levels 
of resource use (see Jackson, 2009).  
As such, little is said about the norms and expectations that surround the role of the cit-
izen-consumer in the CE, such as the seemingly sacrosanct place that consumerism has 
in these versions of collective futures, despite the dire projections of a rapidly climate 
changing world if we carry on, business-as-usual (see Helm, 2015). In sum, whereas the 
CE may be radical from a twentieth century technical-industrial and business model 
perspective, it arguably reinforces the social norms, expectations and roles ascribed to 
us all within the post-industrial, service and consumption-based capitalist economies of 
the Global North, and increasingly, the Global South. But what then of the Ǯnewǯ forms of consumption argued to be emerging, which some 
suggest offer ways of fundamentally altering the nature of how and what we all con-
sume, for the better (e.g. Botsman & Rogers, 2011)? Or put more grandiosely, what of the modes and means of consuming that work to ǲdisrupt mainstream economies and 
consumerism, improve social cohesion, and contribute to the minimization of resource useǳ (Heinrichs, 2013: 229)?  For one, the rise—or one might argue, the re-emergence 
of—the sharing economy (SE) has garnered much attention of late, as financial down-turns and environmental concerns have witnessed more individuals ǲbartering, sharing, 
renting, trading, borrowing, lending, leasing and swapping…a range of assets including goods, services, time, capital, experiences and spaceǳ ȋCooper & Timmer, ʹͲͳͷ: ͹; for 
further discussion of forms and variations of sharing, see Belk, 2014). Rather than a uni-
fied or centralised movement, the SE represents a disparate collection of practices and 
institutions, ranging from local tool or labour-sharing schemes to international online 
platforms such as AirBnB (see Silver, 2013). And despite its diversity in scale, goals and 
location, some estimates suggest that the SE will be worth up to $335 billion in reve-
nues by 2025 (Cooper & Timmer, 2015). Thus it is seen as a central plank of current 
moves towards a CE, both from a consumer and business-to-business perspective (see 
EMF, 2015a).  
However, questions remain about whether the SE can and will live up to the social and 
environmental expectations being placed upon it by some commentators (e.g. Morozov, 
2014) including the need for more critical analysis of actual impacts. In fairness, this is 
an emergent and evolving field, so undoubtedly (or hopefully) such critical research ex-
ploring impacts is taking place as we write. However, the point being made here is the 
need to question whether the SE can and will bring forth the transformations in the 
consumption norms and practices so promised and hoped for, making up for the lack of 
impact in sustainable consumption policies and interventions to date. In short, does the 
SE re-embed, and indeed encourage, the place of conspicuous consumerism in our soci-
ety without fundamentally questioning the ways in which citizens are cast as consumers 
in the CE and SE? Is it thus being assumed that linking the CE with the SE means that the 
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Ǯconsumption issueǯ is being dealt with, and thus there is no need for CE proponents—
such as the EMF—to do more than flag and celebrate the rise SE practices as signaling 
some public buy-in to the CE? Or does it, through its engagement with social spaces and 
relations outside of the domestic sphere, foster positive, collective norms and behav-
iours that can undergird moves towards a CE? These questions are posed here as delib-
erately provocative and are explored further in the following section, which draws on examples of two of the Ǯposter boysǯ of the SE to date, AirBnB and car-sharing clubs, to 
examine existing evidence around the reported impacts of the SE. 
 
3. Is sharing really caring? Questioning social and environmental gains of the SE 
In recent years, the SE has been posited as a set of reconfigured socio-material practices 
that are becoming pivotal forces in the piecemeal restructuring of post-Global Financial 
Crisis economies. Product service systems and for-profit peer-to-peer services like Ub-
er, TaskRabbit and Airbnb have been argued as reshaping production and service deliv-ery, thus creating a form of Ǯre-engineered consumptionǯ ȋSundararajan, ʹͲͳ͵: no pageȌ. 
The benefits of this apparent re-engineering is said to include efficiency gains, the miti-
gation of greenhouse gas emissions and the fostering of greater social capital (Belk, 
2007; Botsman & Rogers, 2010; Leismann et al., 2013). In short, the SE is proposed as no less than ǲa new model of consumption…in which consumers embrace services that 
enable them to access products on demand rather than owning them, thus becoming usersǳ ȋWorld Economic Forum, ʹͲͳͶ: ʹ͵Ȍ. 
Such positive claims however are increasingly met by mounting critiques of the gains to 
be had from the SE. For example, some commentators have argued that the SE is simply 
new territory for venture capitalists to monetize Ǯsharingǯ ȋKalamar, ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ: yet another round in the seemingly endless cycle of capitalist Schumpeterian Ǯcreative destructionǯ 
that enables the continued accumulation of wealth and capital for a small percentage of 
the global population (e.g. Piketty, 2014). In doing so, it marks another step on the al-
ready-ongoing devolving of legal, fiscal and social responsibilities onto a low paid and 
unregulated precariat class (Standing, 2014), who now must internalize the physical 
and economic risks associated with sharing personal goods and services. In addition, it solidifies the neoliberal commodification of daily life, potentially undermining ǲgenuine social connections and solidaritiesǳ ȋ(enwood, ʹͲͳͷ; Schor, ʹͲͳͷ: ͵Ȍ through adding a 
price tag to acts of sharing that in the past may have been done out of goodwill, or not at 
all. Or as Morozov (2014: no page) put it:  
At its worst, the sharing economy turns us into perpetual hustlers, ce-
menting our connection to the global market. This sharing imperative 
dictates that everything that we own, from tangible assets to intangible 
thoughts, be categorised and assigned some kind of a unique identifier 
like the QR code. 
The SE also relies on a constellation of global technology firms and new technologies, which range from access to Ǯbig dataǯ to the availability of an array of Ǯappsǯ and sharing 
platforms. Increasingly, using such technologies is presented as a form of progressive 
participation or empowerment wherein (primarily) urban(e) citizens are recast as ethi-
cal / green consumers. However, this reading of the rise of the online SE hides a number 
of less-than-positive political and environmental consequences (McNeill, 2015; Viitanen 
& Kingston, 2014). That is, as well as long-standing concerns about equity of access and 
use to internet services, under this version of the SE we are all required to be 'smart cit-
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izen-consumersǯ, compelled to be technologically literate ȋSoderstrom et al. ʹͲͳͶȌ 
whilst having little control over the nature and content of our online Ǯsharingǯ interac-
tions (Vanolo, 2014). And for writers like Nicholas Carr (2011, 2014; see also Roberts, 
2014) the growing dependency on computers and apps has resulted in what he calls the Ǯglass cageǯ. That is, where automation and computer technology render users isolated, 
disengaged, and discontented, rather than able to (re) build forms of much-needed so-
cial capital. At more fine scales, neuroscientists have questioned how digital technolo-
gies remake the cognitive environment in which human brains develop and function 
(Greenfield, 2015; Loh & Kanai, 2015), potentially increasing distractibility, reducing 
learning and decreasing empathy (Greenfield 2015). 
However, does the actual evidence for the impacts of the SE in any way match the tenor 
of these critiques? As mentioned above, this is hard to categorically evaluate given a 
paucity of data on impacts to date, especially for more informal / local / ad hoc modes 
of sharing that are becoming common, although often concentrated in certain urban ar-eas that already have Ǯgreenǯ credentials ȋsee Du Cann, ʹͲͳͷȌ e.g. Portland in the USA and Bristol in the UK. (owever, for Ǯmarket leadersǯ, some comments can be made. Take, 
for example, Airbnb: a tourist accommodation service that is advertised as a Ǯtrusted 
community marketplace for people to list, discover and book unique accommodation 
around the world' (Airbnb, 2015). Designed as a peer-to-peer online platform, Airbnb allows Ǯhosts' to rent out their spaces ȋe.g. a living room futon, private room, an entire 
apartment or house) as temporary accommodation. From humble beginnings in 2007 as 
a set of rented air mattresses in a single San Francisco apartment, by mid-2012 an aver-
age of 38,000 people around the world were using Airbnb accommodation every night. 
By the end of that year the company had recorded over four million users and booked 
over 10 million stays (Guttentag, 2015: 1198; Lawler, 2012). And according to some es-
timates, by 2015 Airbnb had acquired two million listings in 34,000 cities across 190 
countries, with the majority being located in Europe and North America. Now arguably "synonymous with the sharing economyǳ ȋShor, ʹͲͳͶ: ʹȌ, Airbnbǯs total value has been 
reported to have reached over $24 billion (USD) (Isaac, 2015).  
Given Airbnb's exponential growth in recent years, debates have broken out over 
whether such an innovation will produce any of the benefits ascribed to the SE. For ex-
ample, does it foster the inter-cultural sharing of home practices and space, as the ad-
vertising suggests: or does it conversely foster "economic self-interest rather than shar-ingǳ ȋShor, ʹͲͳͶ: ͳȌ? Early research on the motivations ȋsee: Guttentag, ʹͲͳͷ; )ssac, ʹͲͳͷ; Schor ʹͲͳͶ, ʹͲͳͷȌ of Airbnb Ǯhostsǯ and Ǯusersǯ suggests that these are indeed 
dominated by economic and financial interests, with social contact, experiential appeal 
and access to residential amenities remaining as secondary concerns. Perhaps unsur-prisingly, the growth of Ǯhostsǯ, especially after the ʹͲͲͺ global economic downturn, is 
connected to the flexibility and earnings potential that Airbnb affords. According to a recent report that outlines New York Cityǯs Airbnb market, the company claims that "ͻͻ 
percent of people on Airbnb are using [the service] as an economic lifelineǳ ȋ)saac, 2015: no pageȌ. And for Ǯusersǯ, the evidence is that the relatively low-costs of (some, not all) 
Airbnb accommodation makes it a viable and attractive alternative to hotels (Quinby & 
Gasdia, 2014; Zervas et al., 2013). 
Airbnb (2015b) have also claimed that their service contributes to efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. By ʹͲ͵Ͳ, the company claims that Ǯusersǯ in the EU 
will likely have emitted 20.9 million tonnes less of GHG emissions when compared to those staying in other forms of Ǯtouristǯ accommodation ȋAirbnb ʹͲͳͷb: ͵Ȍ. (owever, 
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this figure does not account for the very real possibilities of services like Airbnb having a notable Ǯreboundǯ effect ȋSchor ʹͲͳͷ; Sorrell, ʹͲͲͻȌ. That is, its low cost and current 
novelty value actually promotes the expansion of tourist-based consumption (Guttent-
ag, 2015; Tussyadiah & Pesonen, 2015; Zervas et al., 2015). Indeed, there is evidence 
that suggests that, as Airbnb expands the range of lower-cost destination choices, it has 
increased user travel frequency and length of stay (Airbnb, 2015b), which means that ǲtravels resulting from peer-to-peer accommodation may cause more environmental pressures and lead to resource exploitation and overcrowding in the destinationsǳ 
(Tussyadiah & Pesonen 2015: 14). In terms of the latter points about the impact of Airbnb on Ǯdestinationsǯ, there is also some evidence of social cohesion being under-
mined within residential neighbourhoods where Airbnb properties exist e.g. due to the behaviours of Airbnb Ǯusersǯ, as well as the longer term impact on local housing afforda-
bility (e.g. see Tussyadiah & Pesonen, 2015; Zervas et al., 2015). 
Taken together, this evidence does suggest that the socio-environmental benefits of cer-
tain forms of the SE needs to be more carefully considered within claims around the CE. (owever, moving away from Airbnb, other forms of Ǯcollaborative consumptionǯ may 
offer more positive readings on potential and actual impacts of the SE, particularly 
those based on more localized, spatially proximate forms of sharing, which could en-
courage sustained social contact and may side-step some of the apparent rebound ef-
fects (e.g. that do not encourage taking short or long haul flights as tourists). For exam-
ple peer-to-peer car-sharing schemes, like Turo (in the US) or easyCar Club (in the UK) 
(for a list of global carsharing schemes see: Shaheen et al., 2013), have gained consider-
able momentum in recent years. In terms of practicalities, similar to Airbnb, members of 
schemes such as easyCar Club use an internet booking platform to rent out their Ǯidle' 
cars to users, receiving hourly payments, with the opportunity to earn "up to £3000 a 
year" according to the company (easyCar Club, 2015). Interviews with Turo members highlight that many have joined because the ǲsite made it financially viable to buy the vehicleǳ in the first place, while others use the service to pay bills associated with the 
vehicle or pay off their car loans or expenses (Schor, 2015: 9). 
In terms of their contributions to the CE and SE, much has been made of these schemes 
contributions to reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and curbing demand for pri-
vate car-ownership (Firkhorn & Muller, 2011). Carsharing studies in the USA, for in-
stance, have reported mixed results. While a majority of households joining such 
schemes are increasing their emissions by gaining access to automobiles, the remaining 
households are decreasing their emissions by shedding vehicles and driving less (Mar-
tin & Shaheen, 2011). As such, it appears the collective emission reductions outweigh 
the increases, implying that carsharing reduces GHG emissions as a whole (Martin et al. 
2010; Martin & Shaheen, 2011). In terms of curbing car-ownership and use, studies 
have suggested that each new share car added to existing carsharing fleets removes be-
tween 4.6 to 20 private vehicles from the road (Martin et al., 2010). At the same time 
reductions are being made in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with some reports showing 
reductions of up to 67 percent (Hampshire & Gates, 2011; Martin et al., 2010). However, 
there is less said about the in/direct rebound effects of participating in these schemes 
e.g. what happens to any income saved within carsharing households, in terms of in-
creasing other forms of consumption, conspicuous or otherwise. As such, the overall 
contribution of carsharing to the CE remains open to further exploration. 
As such, whilst appealing at first glance, such examples of the apparent SE / CE in prac-
tice raise questions about the all-important issues of curtailing consumption (Newall, 
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2012; Schulz & Bailey, 2014: 277). They also beg further exploration of who is partici-
pating in these forms of sharing and to what ends. That is, whether these forms of shar-
ing enable already well-off households to fulfill certain Ǯlifestyleǯ ambitions rather than 
creating accessible and equitable forms of sustainable sharing e.g. localized food 
schemes as middle-class, niche endeavours (e.g. see Franklin et al., 2011). Thus overall, 
it can be argued that, for some predominant examples at least, the SE re-embeds and 
potentially encourages a societal commitment to continued, unquestioned economic 
growth (see Schultz & Bailey, 2014) and unfettered consumer access to non-essential 
goods and services, such as tourist accommodation. Thus, one could easily conclude we 
are already heading down the path towards a SE that will see the substantive reconfigu-
ration and redistribution of relations of production and consumption, but with ques-
tionable outcomes in terms of resource savings, and social equity and cohesion.  
But, then, do we have to take such conclusions at face value and accept this as inevita-
ble? We argue here that indeed not. One response might be to take particular cases of SE 
in practice, and examine how their norms and processes can be recalibrated to better 
incorporate the hopes and goals of a socially and environmentally just SE. That would 
indeed be useful, but this arguably requires more than the tweaking of individual insti-
tutions or online platforms, one at a time. Rather, it necessitates rethinking the concep-
tual assumptions at the root of current iterations the both the CE and the SE.  
As has been noted elsewhere, prevailing CE framings do little to interrogate implicit as-
sumptions about how, and through what means, change happens (e.g. Hobson, 2015). Although presenting itself as a pragmatic and Ǯreal worldǯ rendition of how to alter the 
economy, the World Economic Forum/Ellen Macarthur Foundation view of the CE, for example, is only one Ǯstoryǯ of how societial transformations can and should take place. 
For instance, in their frameworks and programmes, business leaders—prompted by Ǯwin winǯ scenarios and financial / policy incentives—play the lead role in the CE, and 
thus in the ways our future societies are shaped. This places the quotidian actions of us 
all in a passive and minor role, responding once again to the vicissitudes of global mar-
kets, which operate in places and scales seemingly far removed from our reach. Yet, as 
many writers and activists have argued, there are other ways of thinking about and conceptualizing truly radical reconfigurations and Ǯtransformation discoursesǯ ȋEscobar, 
2015), such as ones that emphasize the power and potential of everyday actions and ǲinitiatives to change not just the day-to-day lives of a handful of committed activists but contribute to the broader societal transformationsǳ ȋCameron & (icks, ʹͲͳͶ: ͷͶȌ. )n 
the next section, we provisionally examine how such frameworks can and do speak to 
some of the challenges of the CE. In doing so, we aim to make the case that the CE would 
benefit significantly from greater engagement with more socio-politically challenging 
theories of change than those that undergird current visions of the CE. 
 
4. What would a post-capitalist AirBnB look like?: shifting ontologies of subjects, 
markets and social change 
Although the search for more socially and environmentally just norms and institutions 
is as long as human history itself, recent and profound socio-environmental challenges 
has seen renewed interest in ways of reframing our current ethics and practices. Some 
philosophers have outlined a renewed but abstract environmental ethics (e.g. Rolston 
III, 2012), whilst others have emphasized the potential of everyday lives, as currently 
lived, to be transformed through seemingly minor but actually profound conceptual 
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shifts (e.g. Loftus, 2012). Examples of the latter, of relevance to discussion of the CE, in-
clude Gibson-Grahamǯs ȋʹͲͲͺ, ʹͲͳͲȌ work on post-capitalist Ǯdiverse economiesǯ, and the Ǯdegrowthǯ agenda ȋJackson, 2009; Latouche, 2010): both of which proffer political-
economic ontologies that aim to de-centre growth and capitalist accumulation as the 
raison d’etre of society. Although differing in details, both approaches question what is 
assumed as sacrosanct and a naturalized part of current realities i.e. the Ǯeconomyǯ and 
economic growth. Instead, they argue that these are socially constructed concepts that 
can be enacted and performed differently, in the process displacing them as the driving 
force of societies, institutions and indeed, ourselves as socio-political subjects.  To elaborate briefly, the concept of Ǯdegrowthǯ, or Ǯdecroissanceǯ ȋLetouche, ʹͲͳͲȌ has emerged from activistsǯ deep concerns about ecological crises and the prevailing path-
ways of technology and development (Escobar, 2015). In short, this movement and 
body of work argues for the: 
downscaling of production and consumption that increases human 
well-being and enhances ecological conditions and equity on the planet. 
It calls for a future where societies live within their ecological means, 
with open, localized economies and resources more equally distributed 
through new forms of democratic institutions 
(http://www.degrowth.org/definition-2). 
The language of de-growth and down-scaling might suggest to some a rolling back of 
hard-won twentieth social and economic gains, and loss of a collective quality of life that 
is now the norm for some and the aspiration for many. But rather than doing without, 
the goal instead is to make more of, and supportively foster, what we already have or have the potential to have. For example, the Ǯdiverse economyǯ ȋGibson-Graham, 2006) 
perspective highlights how mainstream approaches to political economy routinely fail 
to take alternative economic practices and forms of relating seriously (e.g. bartering, 
exchange, gifting), highlighting that most attempts to intervene in the status quo offer at 
best incremental change, or at worst, reaffirm capital-centric norms, as we have argua-
bly pointed towards above in mainstream examples of the SE. Thus, a number of Ǯalter-nativeǯ or Ǯdiverseǯ economic practices which often lie outside of the accepted capitalist 
purview and thus largely hidden in plain sight, represent a critical space with which to 
re-envision a modern political-economy. This may take the form of Local Exchange 
Trading System (LETS), which is a not-for-profit, place-based mutual aid network, 
where for example, one hour of baby-sitting is exchanged directly for one hour of lawn 
mowing, with no money changing hands (for other examples, see Parker et al., 2014). Or 
a community currency scheme, which signals a range of community-led localized ex-change systems, such as the ǮBrixton poundǯ ȋsee Community Currencies in Action, 
2015; also Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013). Whatever the form, the key issue here is the ac-knowledgment, and indeed direct engagement, with the notion that the economy is ǲan always already intrinsically heterogeneous spaceǳ ȋGibson-Graham, 2011: 29). In other words, the economy is  inherently a space of Ǯdifferenceǯ, composed of diverse but signif-
icant processes of production, exchange, ownership, work, renumeration, and consump-
tion which lie outside of the conventional growth paradigms and orthodox views of 
commodity markets, waged and salaried labour, and profit (Healy, 2009). The challenge, 
and the central agenda, thus remains to reinforce economic alternatives that develop political, ethical, and organizational potential, as a Ǯnormalǯ part of the economy and so-
ciety. 
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At first glance, this framing may seem indistinguishable from the goals of the SE as out-
lined above. Indeed, some of the examples of SE in practice can sit comfortably under 
the above frameworks, such as some localized food or energy economies that have so-
cial and environmental goals as central (e.g. see Cameron et al., 2014; Cameron & Hicks 
2014). What does differ are diverse economies and de-growthǯs emphasis on time, place 
and scale. For example, whereas online platforms like Airbnb essentially bring together 
distant and unacquainted individuals to undertake a monetized exchange, community-
based enterprises and exchanges are longer-term, slower and sustained interactions, 
wherein individuals form an array of collectives to meet mutual needs, with the goal of 
becoming ongoing institutions and practices. Simply put, these are localized economies 
that are not based around creating and privatizing financial profit. Indeed, the concept of value differs. Under a CE / SE approach, Ǯidle goodsǯ ȋhouse, carȌ are put to work, to 
create and capture economic value, whilst delivering services to others. From a post-
capitalist perspective, monetary value is not the guiding metric of evaluation and ex-
change, with the development of (often incalculable and intangible) human and social 
capital being key goals and undergirding values. 
Although a great deal more could be said about a variety of post-capitalist perspectives, the goal here is to emphasize that a CE which brings in properly Ǯradicalǯ ontologies of 
markets, citizens and social change diversifies the ways in which ǲour society evenǳ ȋEC, 
2015b: no page) may be changed for the better under the CE. As outlined above, the CE 
rehearses a top-down, business-lead approach to change, under which the consumer 
has to reject or accept new business models, as well as the shift from a Ǯconsumerǯ to a Ǯuserǯ. By contrast, a post-capitalist perspective opens up and experiments with the 
ways in which citizens can engage with different types of circularity, some of which will 
eschew market-based interactions for non-monetary exchanges, aiming to deeply em-
bed notions, and diverse forms, of sharing into norms and places.  
Undoubtedly these forms of institutions already exist around the world, under the guise 
of, for example, social enterprises or local non-profit Ǯswap shopsǯ. Therefore the argu-
ment here is not one of re-inventing the wheel. It is rather to emphasize how the types 
of SE being heralded by proponents of the CE fail to address the real socio-
environmental challenges, as well as spaces for positive change that diverse forms of 
place-based sharing and exchange can foster. This is not the case of simply including food cooperatives or repair cafes into the current list of CE Ǯposter boysǯ, as discussed 
above. Rather, the argument is that it requires the conceptual foundations of the CE, as 
currently framed, be open to ontological critique and theoretical expansion, if positive 
societal transformations are truly at the heart of the CE agenda. 
Does this then mean that ideas like Airbnb are without merit, if we are talking about a 
CE that is more conceptually inclusive than the visions currently being offered by the 
likes of the EMF, for example? Indeed, what would a post-capitalist Airbnb look like? For 
one, it might be based on mutual help and the exchange of skills or knowledge rather 
than the exchange of money e.g. an hour of English language conversation a day in ex-
change for accommodation. It could also require that travel to and from the Airbnb Ǯhostǯ is only undertaken to places that can be reached on public transport or on foot or 
bike. And it could be founded upon on-going exchanges, where Ǯpartneredǯ hosts visit 
each other regularly over time, to build up and sustain the exchanges of skills, culture 
and knowledge. Unrealistic and/or undesirable? Perhaps, under current norms and 
practices, but then that is the point. If the CE is to be truly transformative, issues of 
trust, social capital, power and belonging are integral to any societal step-change (see 
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Fuchs et al., ʹͲͳͷȌ. This is because Ǯthe economyǯ and the Ǯmarketǯ are not distinct and 
concrete spheres separate from society, culture and politics (Jones, 2014). Instead they 
are constituted by everyday practices of citizens and institutions, which can be enacted 
differently if they are first conceptualized differently, as post-capitalist perspectives 
suggest.  
 
5. Concluding comments 
When one is attempting to garner public and political attention, a catchy framework of-ten comes in handy. As mentioned in this paper, the EMFǯs acrostic ReSOLVE serves 
such a purpose, encapsulating as it does verbs that are key in shifts towards the CE: Re-
generate, Share, Optimize, Loop, Virtualize and Exchange. The argument of this paper is 
not that the likes of the EMF have the wrong verbs, or are missing some crucial ones 
from this list. Rather, that there is now a definite need to consider the non-technological 
/ digital meanings of these words, and their place in the CE. For example, according to the EMF, the ǮExchangeǯ component of the CE encapsulates a focus on replacing old with 
advanced non-renewable materials; applying new technologies (e.g. 3D printing) and 
choosing new product/services (EMF, 2015a: 21). These, on paper, seem like interest-
ing and cutting-edge material innovations, which are not being critiqued here per se. 
However, the social implications of these moves need to also be thoroughly considered 
as central to the CE e.g. the potential for further rebound effects and hyper-
consumerism taking hold, if, for example, these material innovations facilitate the in-
creased, real-time throughput of goods. 
What is at stake, if the social and political facets of the CE are not given greater consid-
eration? To be clear, suggesting that a post-capitalist framework helps re-conceptualize 
the prevailing vision of the CE is not proposed here as an exercise in theoretical pedant-
ry. It is proposed herein rather because current narratives of social and political path-
ways to the CE arguably rehearse and replay failed ecological modernist assumptions 
and mechanisms of the consumer, markets and indeed, the central means and ac-
tors/institutions involved in creating sustainable social and environmental transfor-
mation. As this paper aimed to show,  prevailing discourse of the CE ascribe to the con-
sumer limited and problematic means of engaging with the issues at the heart of the CE, 
such as responding to environmental labels or renting rather than buying goods: nei-
ther of which have to date been able to bring about the desired widespread adoption of 
so-called Ǯsustainable lifestylesǯ. And in doing so, current technologically-focused rendi-
tions of the CE enable us all to keep side-stepping the actual roots and origins of the Ǯre-source crunchǯ. This potential feeds into the rise of absolute levels of resource consump-
tion, which have not and cannot, be off-set by greater efficiencies and de-coupling (Jack-
son, 2009). Thus, in short, if the CE is indeed the next big political economic project of 
the EU, then the role, potential and place of the citizen—and indeed the economy as a 
complex socio-political entity—needs to be open to further debate and consideration, including engagement with more Ǯradicalǯ ideas about the pathways, aims and roles as-
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